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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
As explained in the opening briefs, Granite School District (hereafter "Granite")
and Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints (hereafter the "Church") are the real parties in economic interest in this case.
Due to differences in laws and circumstances, each party is filing a separate brief, even
though the Utah State Tax Commission (hereafter the "Commission") filed a single
answering brief. The Church joins in the Argument portion of Granite's brief.
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Commission's statement of the issues is incomplete and incorrect. It is
incomplete because there are several sub-issues relevant to the final determination of
Arco's liability. It is incorrect in that the Commission specifically assessed a Use Tax,
not a Sales Tax or a Sales and Use Tax. Since these distinctions are relevant to the
argument, Arco urges this Court to use Arco's statement of the issues.
REPLY TO THE DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The Commission has omitted important statutes and administrative rules which
show that the Decision below is not supported by current law. Arco requests the
Court to accept the more complete list of authorities provided in the Opening Brief.

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Commission's statement of the case assumes at least one of the issues in
dispute on this appeal. Arco's contract with Interwest and Interwest's contract with the
Church contained "furnish and install" language, but were at most conditional furnish
and install contracts since they also contained a right for the Church to elect to

purchase and supply some of the materials. The parties expected that this option
would be exercised, and it was. After exercise of the Church's option, the contract was
an "install only" contract with respect to these materials. Again, Arco urges this Court
to accept Arco's more complete statement of the case.
REPLY TO THE STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Commission's Statement of Facts is incomplete. Since the Commission did
not challenge any of Arco's original Statement of Facts, and Arco's Statement is
supported by references to undisputed portions of the record, Arco urges the Court to
refer to Arco's more complete Statement of Facts in reviewing this case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission does not have any greater expertise than this Court in
interpreting statutes which have a clear legislative purpose and which involve questions
previously settled by this Court, and therefore the proper standard of review is
correction of error. However, the Decision below cannot be sustained under any
standard because it contravenes legislative intent, prior holdings of this Court, and the
language of the statute, and is inconsistent both internally and as applied.
The Commission has mischaracterized this case as involving interpretation of an
exemption when the Taxpayer (Arco) is not entitled to (and does not claim) any
exemption. In fact, the Commission is attempting to broaden the long-established
scope of the Use Tax so that it is additive to the Sales Tax rather than complementary
and no longer limited to the narrow scope intended by the legislature. To support this
admitted change of policy, which was argued for below on the grounds of a need for

more revenue, the Commission has made numerous errors in legal analysis, including:
(1) inconsistent statements of law (e.g., assessing Arco for some, but not all, of the
materials which the Church purchased and Arco attached to the realty; and stating first
that the contractor and then the subcontractor should be liable for the tax as the
installer); (2) reliance on a property tax decision and out-of-state decisions interpreting
vastly different statutes while disregarding the full standards set by those courts; (3)
adding words to the definition of "use" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14); (4) ignoring
its own Administrative Rules regarding the scope of the religious and charitable
exemption and the means for determining the purchaser when applying the
governmental exemption; and (5) ignoring well-settled principles of contract law such as
the course of dealing between the parties and the standards of practice in the industry.
Finally, the Commission discriminates unreasonably by applying its new policy
retroactively even though it has applied similar changes to other entities prospectively.
Based on any of these errors, the Decision below must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
L THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS CORRECTION OF ERROR
The Commission relies on Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of Utah
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) to claim that this Court must review
the Commission's Decision under the intermediate standard of reasonableness, rather
than correction of error, saying: "The Morton court has provided guidance by stating,
'fi]n the absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the specific question in
issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a policy

determination.'" (Tax Commission Brief "T.C.Br." at 16:, emphasis added.) The
Commission then asserts that no legislative intent can be gleaned from the language of
the statute itself, so the deferential standard of review is required. (Id. at 16-17.)
The Commission's reliance upon Morton is erroneous for two fundamental
reasons. First, the Commission ignores the basic reason given in Morton to justify
applying an intermediate standard. In that case the Court explained:
Rather, what has developed as the dispositive factor is whether the agency, by
virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a better position than the courts to give
effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved. We have stated: "We do not
defer to the Commission when construing statutory terms or when applying
statutory terms to the facts unless the construction of the statutory language or
the application of the law to the facts should be subject to the Commissions's
expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical, first-hand experience with the
subject matter." (Bennett v. Indus. Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986))
Morton, 814 P.2d at 586, emphasis added.
Here, as the Commission concedes in its brief, "[t]he decision hinges on . . .
conclusions of law reached by the Commission." (T.C.Br, at 19.) More specifically, the
Commission's Decision turns on its conclusion that "conversion of tangible personal
property into real property is deemed to be the consumption or use of the tangible
personal property, which is the taxable event." (T.C.Br, at 25 quoting Gen. Docs. R. 93,
emphasis added.) This conclusion in turn depends for its validity on (1) the scope of
the rule created by this court in Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101
Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942);1 and (2) whether attachment of Church-owned

1

This case also involves Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S, but that rule was adopted as a
codification of Utah Concrete, and thus the rule does not represent an independent
determination of the Tax Commission entitled to separate deference.

personalty to realty by a non-owner is a taxable "use" of the property contrary to the
holdings of this court in Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah
152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947); Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209
P.2d 208 (1949),2 as well as the recent determination of this Court in Union Pacific
Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv.Rep. 13 (Nov. 6, 1992).
The Commission cannot seriously argue that it has special expertise in interpreting
Supreme Court decisions and that this Court should therefore defer to such expertise.
Thus, the Commission's opinion is entitled to no deference. See also Hales Sand &
Gravel v. State Tax Commission, 200 Utah Adv.Rep. 3 (Nov. 12, 1992), fn. 3 at 7-8.
Second, contrary to the Commission's claim, there is clear legislative intent
regarding the intended scope of the Use Tax, which is the true issue involved.3 The
statute itself, Section 59-12-103, as enacted by the legislature plainly assesses the tax
against the "purchaser." Arco was not the purchaser. In Section 59-12-102(14)(a), the
legislature defined "use" to require ownership (or a leasehold interest).

Moreover, this

2

The Tax Commission cites decisions from other states to distinguish these and other cases,
claiming that what Geneva called a holding is mere dicta. (T.C. Brief at 26-28.) However, this
Court can determine for itself what weight to give its own pronouncements. The Tax
Commission's additional suggestion that these cases are irrelevant because they were decided
before the 1987 unification of the Sales Tax Act and the Use Tax Act (T.C. Brief at 26-27) is
erroneous for two reasons. First, this Court has already held that the separate taxes were to be
construed as if they were a single act, and thus the law change merely conformed the structure
of the statute to its pre-existing interpretation. If such change has any significance at all, it is
to reinforce legislative approval of this Court's prior interpretations. Greenhalgh v. Payson City,
530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975). Second, the restructuring of the tax provisions in 1987 has no
effect on this case, because all of the taxes assessed in this case were for periods which predate
the Sales and Use Tax consolidation which became effective July 1, 1987.
3

The Tax Commission's decision specifically assessed a Use Tax and not a Sales Tax
against Arco. The correct scope of that tax is discussed below.

Court's opinions in Geneva and Union Portland Cement expressly declared that the
legislative intent behind the Use Tax prohibited applying a Use Tax to materials
purchased in Utah.4 The Court again referred to the intent of the legislature in Union
Pacific. Since a discernable legislative intent is present, Morton mandates the
"correction of error" standard, stating:
[W]hen legislative intent concerning the specific question and issue can be
derived through traditional methods of statutory construction, the agency's
interpretation will be granted no deference and the statute will be
interpreted in accord with its legislative intent.
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589, emphasis added.
Accordingly, under Morton, the Commission's conclusions of law must be reviewed
under the correction-of-error standard.
H. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT SUSTAINABLE
UNDER EITHER STANDARD
In this and its opening Brief, Arco demonstrated that the Use Tax assessed by the
Commission is contrary to the prior opinions of this Court and the legislative intent of
the statute. As "[governmental agencies cannot deprive the courts of their judicial
functions nor can the agencies extend the operation of the statute by administrative
regulations" {Utah Concrete Products, at 412), the Commission's Decision is clearly
unreasonable, and therefore cannot be sustained even under the partial deference
"reasonableness" standard sought by the Commission.

4

The opening brief regarding the Church addressed the relevance of ownership at 26-27,
and the inapplicability of the Use Tax to materials not purchased either outside Utah or in
interstate commerce at 21-23.
£

Hereafter, this brief will establish that the Commission's Brief misidentifies the
issues, is internally inconsistent and misinterprets the cited authorities. This brief will
also show that the Decision is contrary to the language of the statute, the Commission's
own Administrative Rules, and is discriminatory in operation. These additional factors
reinforce the inescapable conclusion that the Commission's Decision cannot be upheld
even under the deferential standard of review the Commission wishes to apply.
m. THIS CASE TURNS ON THE SCOPE OF THE USE TAX AND NOT ON
THE CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTIONS AS THE COMMISSION ASSERTS
Part III of the Commission's Brief characterizes this case as involving a simple
construction of the exemptions available to the Church and Granite under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-104. (T.C.Br. Argument III at 23-26.) Using this characterization, the
Commission argues that because this case involves construction of an exemption, all
doubts should be resolved against Arco pursuant to Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980).
To determine whether the interpretation of an exemption is involved, it is first
necessary to ascertain whether the vendors sold the materials to Arco or to the exempt
entities. If the materials were sold to Arco, Arco is liable for a Sales Tax since Arco
has never claimed that it is entitled to an exemption on any of the materials it
purchased.5 However, not only does taxation of Arco as the purchaser not involve
interpretation of the scope of an exemption, it is also contrary to the language of the

5

When Arco itself purchased materials used in the contract it recognized that there was no
exemption and paid the Sales Tax thereon. There was no tax deficiency assessed or disputed as
to those materials.

Decision which did not find Arco subject to a Sales Tax. What the Decision ultimately
concluded was that Arco "was the real property contractor for those materials and
pursuant to Rule 865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on those materials." (Reiterated
verbatim with respect to both Granite and the Church, Gen. Docs. R.100, 102,
emphasis added.) That conclusion demonstrates that the Commission did not find Arco
to be the purchaser.
Instead, the Commission found that, although the materials were purchased by the
exempt entities, Arco is nevertheless subject to a Use Tax because "conversion of
tangible personal property into real property is deemed to be the consumption or use
of the tangible personal property, which is the taxable event." (T.C.Br, at 25, quoting
Gen. Docs. R. 93, emphasis added.) This conclusion obviously results from construing
the scope of the Use Tax, rather than from determining the limits of an exemption to
the sales tax.
The scope of the exemptions is irrelevant to Arco because if the exempt entities
fail to qualify for an exemption, it would result on a tax to them and not on Arco.
Thus, regardless of who is determined to be the purchaser, taxation of Arco does not
depend upon the scope of an exemption. When not construing an exemption, the
correct rule of law is that all doubts about the scope of the statute must be liberally
construed in the potential taxpayer's favor. See Pacific lntermountain Express Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (1958), citing with approval
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).

8

IV. INSTALLING THE CHURCH'S PROPERTY CANNOT
SUBJECT ARCO TO A USE TAX
The Commission's primary argument is that personal property should be taxed
some time prior to its incorporation into realty. (See T.C.Br. 25, 27.) The
Commission therefore ruled that Arco is subject to a Use Tax, alleging that converting
personalty to realty subjects the entity physically attaching the property to a Use Tax as
the "consumer" of such property. (T.C.Br, at 25; Gen.Docs.R. 93.) This position is
insupportable because it is contrary to legislative intent and the language of the statute
which requires ownership as discussed above and in the prior brief. (Ch.Br. at 15.)
Another fundamental error of the Commission's approach is that it ignores the
mechanics of the Sales Tax and both the mechanics and purpose of the Use Tax as a
complement to the Sales Tax. The proper way to analyze the scope of the Sales and
Use Taxes was set forth by this Court in Union Pacific where, as here, the Commission
asserted a Use Tax on personal property attached to realty. This Court rejected the
Commission's contention that use, storage, or consumption of material in this state is
always a taxable event allowing taxation of the increases in value to the materials
obtained through out-of-state services, and confirmed that purchases within this state
which are not amenable to the Sales Tax are not thereafter subject to the Use Tax.
The Court began its analysis as follows:
In order to analyze this claim, we must first examine the Utah Sales and
Use Tax Act (the "Act") and distinguish between the sales tax component
and the use tax component of the Act. The Commission's rules differentiate
the two . . .
Id., at 15.

After analyzing Utah Admin. R. 865-19-1S, this Court first explained, then
reiterated, the application of the Sales Tax and the Use Tax as follows:
To recapitulate, the sales tax imposes a transaction tax on certain sales and
certain services that occur in Utah. Complementing the Sales Tax, the Use Tax
imposes an excise tax on tangible property and certain services performed in
connection with that property, where the property is stored or used in Utah but is
not subject to the Utah Sales Tax because it was purchased or the service was
performed outside of Utah.
The Act permits the state to tax "retail sales of tangible personal property made
within the state." certain enumerated services rendered within the state, and instate storage, use or consumption of tangible property purchased outside the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103.
Id. at 16-17, emphasis added.
When the Sales Tax is separated from the Use Tax according to the above
instructions, it becomes apparent that both taxes have a "transactional" nature as well
as geographic limits. Moreover, this Court said the "proper focus is . . .on the
transactions that actually took place, whether inside or outside Utah, and the taxability
of each transaction. Id. at 18. Acting as complementary taxes, both taxes are assessed
against the "purchaser" (who by clear implication must be the owner, see Utah Concrete
Products) on the amount paid to acquire title at the time of sale, Le.9 when title
transfers.6 It follows that Arco cannot be subject to a Use Tax on material it doesn't
own, and because the materials stored and installed were not acquired out-of-state by

6

As a result of specific statutory language extending the scope of the taxes, they can also
apply to the rendition of services or payments incident to a lease. However, since Union
Pacific did not involve any leased property, this Court omitted references to leases from its
discussion, presumably for convenience and clarity. This case does not involve either leases or
taxable services, and therefore references to both leases and services are hereafter omitted for
the same reasons of simplicity and clarity.
10

Arco.7 This Court's holding in Union Pacific alone is thus dispositive of the
Commission's Use Tax arguments.
It is therefore not surprising that the Commission has not cited a single Utah case
in which the court decided either (1) that the act of attaching personalty to realty was
itself a taxable event, or (2) that any tax due fell upon the entity making the
attachment regardless of ownership. In every case assessing a tax on the party
converting8 personalty to realty, the entity attaching the property was the owner, and
the taxable transaction was the prior purchase, not the act of conversion.
This Court addressed both issues, beginning with the ownership requirement, in
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah
1992), stating:
[0]ne who purchases building materials for use in constructing homes, highways
and the like, is a "real property contractor,1' and the contractor's purchases of
tangible personal property used for such purposes are taxable transactions under
the sales tax law.
The term "real property contractor" is thus linked to purchasing, not merely
attaching, the property. Moreover, as required by Union Pacific, the purchase is
expressly stated to be the taxable transaction. Indeed, attachment (which comes after
the purchase) is effectively disavowed as a taxable event because the tax applied is
expressly stated to be a sales tax, and "purchases are the last transactions in which
7

At the hearing, it was assumed that all of the materials in question were purchased in
Utah. However, materials purchased outside Utah by the Church cannot constitutionally be
taxed to the Church in any event when similar purchases inside Utah are not taxed, {Union
Pacific, at 17), and they cannot be separately taxed to Arco if Arco were not the purchaser.
8

Utah Concrete actually assessed the vendor which should have collected the tax from the
buyers.

those materials can be subjected to the sales tax." {Id. at 306, emphasis added.) It
follows that under this definition the Church and Granite are the "real property
contractors" and the only parties potentially subject to tax because they are the
purchasers of the materials at issue.
Interestingly, even the Colorado cases cited by the Commission reject application
of the Use Tax to a party which only attaches the materials to realty. Howard
Electrical v. Department of Revenue, 111 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1989), rejects the Commission's
proposition that use of the materials is a separate taxable event from the purchase of
the materials. In Howard Electrical, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
A Use Tax is considered supplementary to, not separate from, Sales Tax.
Although [the plaintiff] contends that the Use Tax is a separate tax and should be
viewed in isolation, only the most abstract legalistic approach can justify such an
argument. We are aware of no court where such an artificial division of the tax
scheme has been accepted in determining the effects of the Use Tax on
commerce.
Id., citing AA. Tobin Const. Co. v. Weed, 158 Colo. 430, 407 P.2d 350 (1965) (emphasis
added, citations omitted.)
Howard Electrical also approved without comment Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Ass% Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 636 P.2d 1335 (Colo.App. 1981), which in
turn set forth the following limitation to applying the Use Tax to contractors who don't
own the building materials:
[T]he owner who determines the nature and character of the structure is the one
who uses all of the materials entering into the structure. If the owner does the
work himself, there can be no question as to who used the material. When he
engages another to erect the structure the act of making the improvement is still
his act. Such materials as he puts into the work are used by the one directing
and controlling it.

Id. at 1337, quoting Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571, 81 P.2d 764
(1938). This statement is particularly strong since, although Colorado's Use Tax statute
(which taxes "every person" instead of "purchasers") is not predicated upon ownership,
the court nevertheless refused to assess a tax against a mere contractor.
V. ARCO DID NOT PURCHASE THE CHANGE ORDER MATERIALS
Historically, this Court has stated that the Sales Tax accrues upon transfer of title
or possession. See Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 719
(Utah 1990). In a recent case where taxability of shipping charges hinged upon when
title passed this Court found that the parties were free to govern title passage through
written agreements. Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc., v. State Tax Comm% 200 Utah
Adv.Rep. 3 (Nov. 12, 1992).
The legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(8) to exempt charities from
tax on materials they purchase in connection with their charitable activities. Utah
Admin. R. 865-19-43S embodies this exemption by stating that: "All sales to or by
religious . . . institutions in the conduct of their regular religious . . . functions are
not subject to sales tax." This rule does not permit the Commission to expressly
revoke the exemption for building materials based on whether or not the church is a
contractor. Neither should the Commission be allowed to defeat legislative intent by
refusing to recognize the right of the Church to elect to buy its own building materials.
The Commission has offered no justification for why the parties to a construction
contract should not be able to freely elect (and from time to time change their election
if it suits their purposes) which entity is to be the purchaser of the materials, or why

this Court should not give credence to such elections in the same manner that Hales
allowed the point of delivery to be freely changed by agreement.
There is precedent for allowing the parties such freedom.

In Ford I Twaits Co.

v. Utah State Tax Comm% 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944), this Court looked solely
to who paid the vendor and when title passed to the government in concluding that,
because the contractor paid the vendor and then took title before transferring the
material to the government, the exemption granted to the government did not apply.9
However, the Court also said:
Had it so intended, it would have been a simple matter to authorize plaintiff
to buy as an agent of the government, to issue a tax exemption certificate
referred to in Article 31 of the contract, or otherwise declare the goods
government property.
(Twaits, at 344.) In this case, the Church clearly intended to purchase the disputed
materials, the Church ordered the materials (Gen.Docs. R. 81, T.C.Br. H 16, p. 11),
paid for them (Gen.Docs. R. 82, T.C.Br. H 20, p. 12), and title passed directly from the
vendor to the Church. (Gen.Docs. R. 82, T.CBr. If 21, Pg. 12.) Thus every criteria
expressed in Twaits is present here. In the instant case, all of these traditional
determinants of ownership, together with several other incidents listed by the courts
cited in the Commission's Brief, show that the Church and Granite owned the
construction materials at issue.

9

The Tax Commission has also promulgated Utah Admin. R. 865-19-42S, which bases the
determination of whether the governmental entity is the purchaser solely upon whether the
governmental entity issued payment for the property. Although the Church does not come
strictly under this rule, there is no reason why payment by the Church should have any less
relevance.
1 A

As noted, the Commission concluded that applicability of the tax depended upon
who was the actual contractor. In support of its claim that Arco was the contractor
and thus subject to taxation, the Commission announced a list of special criteria to
determine which party was responsible for affixing the building materials. The
Commission then decided that Arco should be subject to the Use Tax based on duties
necessarily incident to the general contractor and its subcontractors receiving the
materials as bailees. Because the statute places the tax on the "purchaser," the
Commission was forced to characterize what amounts to "incidents of bailment" as "the
most significant 'incidents of ownership'." (T.C.Br, at 29.) However, there is no
necessity for using a special list of factors beyond those set forth in Twaits for
identifying the purchaser, and there is good reason to believe the Commission did not
fashion its list of factors for this purpose.
To begin with, identification of the entity receiving property from a vendor can
have substantial unintended ramifications in the context of determining whether a
transaction is taxable in Utah as a sale, and the probable legislative intent is that the
threshold for having taxable sales should be as low as possible.
Second, the Commission's list of factors for identifying the contractor is not
suitable as an indicator of ownership because it confuses the duties of a bailee with the
burdens and benefits of ownership. In this case, there were four classes of materials
which the Church purchased and turned over to Interwest to be incorporated into the
building. (Ch.Br. at 6, 7.) It was undisputed that the Church was the purchaser and
owner of the first three classes, and that Interwest and Arco were mere bailees. Yet

Arco had exactly the same duties with respect to all four classes of materials. (Ch.Tr.
p 53 In 1-21.) There is simply no justification, and the Commission offers none, for
applying different standards on only one class of those materials.
Third, the Commission's use of a complex list of factors without guidance as to
how those factors are to be weighed and applied has made it impossible for taxpayers
to understand their duties under the Decision, particularly since the factors include
events which may occur long after the potentially taxable transfer is completed.
Indeed, the Commission itself seems to have trouble in interpreting its own rule
when it argues in one sentence that ,f[h]ere, as in [Twaits] the 'contractor' [Interwest] is
the party 'storing, using and consuming' the materials;11 then in the next sentence states
that Arco was the "subcontractor" through which the "contractor" made its conversion;
and finally in the third sentence says that the tax should fall on Arco because it was
the entity "storing or using the property." (T.C.Br, at 21.) Thus, two sentences say the
tax falls on Interwest as the contractor, and the very next sentence says the tax falls on
Arco. This was the very confusion objected to on pages 28-30 of Arco's Brief
regarding the Church-related assessment. That objection, and several others showing
defects in the Commission's Decision, were ignored in the Commission's Response
Brief, however. This is precisely the kind of inconsistency which makes the Decision
unreasonable in law and unworkable in practice.
Finally, in both the Decision and the Commission's Brief, it is clear that each
deals with the "burdens and benefits of ownership" only in a Use Tax context of
determining which party was responsible for affixing the materials to the real property.
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The Decision fails to give any weight to the significant burdens of an owner other those
of a bailee during construction. If the Decision were trying to determine who
"purchased" the materials in the ordinary sense, it would have specifically focused on
the relationship of the parties to the vendors to see who was the buyer, looking
primarily to issues like passage of title, payment, privity of contract, warranties and
bidding based on the credit worthiness of the buyer. It would also have weighed issues
not directly related to installation such as insurance, final selection of materials, liability
for unsuitable materials, right to remove materials, rights to surplus materials and
changes in financing and retainage. It didn't.10 Instead, the Decision focused on the
handling and control of the materials during the construction process to see who was
the contractor. In addition, the Decision qualified its conclusion to indicate that it was
only considering the construction process itself by saying:
[T]he LDS Church did not have substantial involvement in the project, or with
the materials, during the construction process. The general contractor and the
subcontractors had nearly total control of and responsibility for the materials
during the construction process. . . . Petitioner [Arco] installed those materials
into the project, and acted as the owner of those materials by assuming the risks,
burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership during the construction
process. Therefore, . . . [Arco] converted those materials from tangible personal
property into real property. Therefore, [Arco] was the real property contractor
for those materials and pursuant to Rule 865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on
those materials.
(Decision at 35-37; Gen.Docs. R. 100-102, emphasis added.) Moreover, the Decision
10

The Decision did mention some of these factors in passing, but gave no clue as to how
these factors were weighted or their relative significance. However, before listing the factors
the Commission qualified its view of their relevance not by saying the review was to determine
who was the purchaser, but by saying the review was to see "whether or not the exempt
organization exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials." (Gen.Docs. R.91.) The
concepts of "person who attached" and "purchaser" are far too distinct for an inquiry directed at
determining the former to shed meaningful light on the identity of the latter.

specifically applied a Use Tax to Arco, showing that it did not intend to assess the tax
based upon the transfer from the vendor since that would have resulted in a Sales Tax.
The Commission's Brief also reflects that the incidents of ownership are intended
to apply only in the context of determining the identity of the contractor under the
Commission's theory of the Use Tax. The brief erronously states:
This court's interpretation of "use" in Interwest [Interwest Aviation v. County Board
of Equalization, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987)] and the Tax Commission's application
of that principle in the instant case are consistent with the definition contained in
§ 59-12-102(14). That definition does not require "ownership" of the property in
order to impose a use tax. The basis of a taxable use is the exercise of a legal
right over the property, whether that right is granted by title, lease, or contract.
. . . In this case, Arco's contract created both legal rights and duties concerning
the materials. As found by the Tax Commission, those contractual rights and
duties placed the significant "incidents of ownership" on Arco. Therefore, the
Commission properly found that Arco's use of the material was taxable.
(T.C.Br, at 30-31, emphasis added.) Note that the Commission Brief states the
relevant rights were created by the contract, not by a purchase from the vendor.
In addition to other errors discussed above, this passage reaffirms the fact that
the Commission's Decision is based on a misreading of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12102(14), which says the use must be incident to "ownership or the leasing" - not by
"title, lease or contract" as the Commission claims. In short, the Commission's
statement is patently incorrect. Since no lease is involved, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12102(14) clearly requires ownership.
The Commission also cites Interwest Aviation as not requiring ownership.
Reliance upon Interwest Aviation appears entirely misplaced, as it concerned property
tax rather than sales or use tax, with concomitantly different public policies. The
Commission cites Interwest Aviation for its indication that legal title may be disregarded

for purposes of property tax assessment. However, the Commission fails to address the
underlying reasons and elements considered in reaching that determination.
In this case, it is undisputed that the subject properties are used for religious and
government purposes, and any tax imposed will be paid by the religious and
government entities. Clearly, this is different from the circumstances underlying the
property tax determination. Moreover, if the Commission wishes to rely upon Interwest
Aviation for an incidents-of-ownership test, it must also accept Interwest Aviation's
discussion of that principle. The Court looked at eight incidents of ownership, saying:
Significantly, (1) the plaintiffs built their own improvements from their own
plans, (2) they had full use and enjoyment of, and profit from, the
improvements, (3) they paid no rent for the improvements that year, (4)
they maintained the improvements completely at their own cost, (5) they
took a depreciation deduction for 1982 in their federal income tax returns
and the leases lowed them to depreciate fully the cost of improvements for
federal income tax purposes, (6) they provided and maintained all necessary
insurance coverage to protect the property and the city, (7) they expressly
agreed to pay Possession and Use Taxes on the improvements, and (8) they
could remove the improvements if the city defaulted on its obligations.
Id. at 1226-1227.
To the extent that any of these criteria is applicable to the instant case, it would
indicate that ownership is in the Church and/or Granite. Although there is no
contention by the Church that it was responsible for actually affixing the personal
property to the realty, virtually all other factors recognized by this Court in Interwest
Aviation are present: (1) the exempt entities required the improvements to be built
according to their own plans, (2) the exempt entities used and profited from the
improvements, (3) Arco never occupied the improvements in a way that could make
them subject to rent, (4) the exempt entities maintained the improvements after

completion, completely at the exempt entity's cost, (5) Arco took no depreciation for
the properties, (6) the exempt entities provided the insurance coverage during the
construction period, (7) the exempt entities agreed to pay any Sales or Use Taxes
imposed, and (8) Arco could not remove the improvements even if the entities
defaulted in their contractual obligations.
Application of the eight incidents of ownership, looked to by the court in Interwest
Aviation, none of which involved who attached personally to realty, plainly indicates the
Church and Granite are the owners. Under the principles of that case, therefore, the
tax would not fall on Arco.
Finally, even if the Commission did mean to adopt a list of factors for determining ownership, this Court is not bound by such action. The legislative intent of the
statute is better served by allowing exempt entities reasonable access to the exemptions
the legislature adopted to implement public policy. This is best accomplished by
looking at the limited factors of Twaits and Utah Admin. R. 865-19-42S.
VL THE COMMISSION'S DECISION REPRESENTS AN ABRUPT AND
UNWARRANTED REVERSAL OF WELL-ESTABLISHED POLICY
The Commission asserts that its current position has been clearly established law
since 1942. (T.C.Br, at 20-23.) The Commission fails to explain, however, why the
practices and policies at issue had been used for years and become widespread (Ch.
Brief at 9), and why -- by its own admission - the Commission itself has allowed the
practice for many years, and even had auditors opine as to its acceptability (Gen.Docs.
R. 71 HIT 24-27). The fact that the Commission is admittedly reversing its own longstanding interpretation (Ch. Brief at 24, Ch.Tr. p.94 In. 10-21) again demonstrates the
on

unreasonableness of the Commission's position, particularly when the reason given at
the hearing for the changes was simply the desire for more revenue. (Ch.Tr., Add. Ex.
4, p 91 In 20 through p 92 In 22.)
VH. THE CHANGE ORDERS ALTERED THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
As noted in Arco's opening brief, the change orders altered the parties'
contractual duties. In response to this contention, the Commission argues that the
change orders were of no effect, citing an isolated portion of contractual language for
that proposition. Again, however, the Commission reads the critical language
incorrectly. A brief look at the language quoted on page 34 of the Commission's Brief
shows that the language which requires work to be done "under the original conditions
and terms" applies only to additional work. The change orders at issue in this case
deleted the contractual obligation to furnish certain materials. Similarly, the language
about not relieving the contractor "of any of its duties or obligations" can only be read
as referring to duties or obligations other than to supply materials which the parties
have subsequently agreed the Church would furnish. Otherwise it produces a contract
in which "changes make no changes," an absurd result. If the quoted language were
construed in this way, and if nothing else were considered, which is the Commission's
approach, this language would have required the contractor to purchase and provide a
duplicate of all Change Order Materials. This was not what the parties understood,
intended or did. Even if the Commission is correct as to the meaning of the quoted
language as of the date the contract was signed, the parties plainly intended the
Change Orders to amend the contract. Such intent was legally effective since the

Change Orders were all executed subsequent to the execution of the contract, and
therefore superseded the original language. Thus the Change Orders had the effect of
relieving the contractors (including Arco) of the duty to supply the Change Order
Materials .
Instead of looking at isolated snips of language taken out of context, this Court
should do as the Commission requests earlier in its brief and interpret the contract
based upon "economic reality" (T.C. Br. at 29-30), with regard for both the dealings
between the parties and the course of dealing in the industry where these arrangements
were well understood and widely utilized. (Gr.Tr., pp.18-19, 137, 168-9; Ch.Tr., p.47.)
Vffl. THE COMMISSION APPLIES THE LAW INCONSISTENTLY
In Union Pacific, the Commission determined that because the formula used in
Union Pacific's tax calculations was a long-standing practice, imposing taxes for prior
years would be retroactive lawmaking. The practice of using change orders was also of
longstanding duration and used by many exempt entities and many contractors over a
number of years. When the Commission applies changes to other taxpayers only
prospectively, application of this change to Arco retroactively is arbitrary, capricious
and unfairly discriminatory. If this Court upholds the taxability of the property
purchased by the exempt organizations, such change should be applied prospectively
only, consistent with the Commission's treatment of Union Pacific.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's Decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjustified by statute
or case law under either standard of review. This Court should therefore refuse to
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extend the Use Tax to reach materials sold within Utah, and hold that where an
exempt entity directly pays for tangible personal property and title to the property is
transferred directly to the exempt entity pursuant to a contract with the vendor (except,
of course, where the vendor attaches the property to realty as part of the transaction),
the sale is to the exempt entity and free from Sales Tax under Utah Admin. Rules 86519-58S.A.4, 865-19-43S.A and 865-19-42S. The Court should then apply that rule of
law to the undisputed facts of this case and dismiss the deficiency against Arco.
If the court finds otherwise, the court should articulate a new standard which is
capable of being administered, and apply the decision prospectively only with a
corresponding dismissal of the instant deficiency against Arco.
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